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A logic of propositional control for truthful implementations
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Source Theoretical Aspects Of Rationality And Knowledge archive
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge table of contents
California
SESSION: Contributed papers table of contents
Pages 237-246  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-560-4
Authors
Nicolas Troquard  University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
Wiebe van der Hoek  University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
Michael Wooldridge  University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We introduce a logic designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We give a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., that every social choice function can be characterised as a formula of the logic. We show the decidability of the logic and give a complete axiomatization. To demonstrate the value of the logic, we show in particular how it can be applied to the problem of determining whether a social choice function is strategy-proof.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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B. F. Chellas. Modal Logic: an introduction. Cambridge University Press, 1980.
 
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P. Dasgupta, P. Hammond, and E. Maskin. The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibiliy. Review of Economic Studies, 46: 185--216, 1979.
 
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A. Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica, 41(4):587--601, 1973.
 
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H. Moulin. The Strategy of Social Choice. Advanced Textbooks in Economics. North Holland, 1983.
 
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M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. The MIT Press, 1994.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Nicolas Troquard: colleagues
Wiebe van der Hoek: colleagues
Michael Wooldridge: colleagues