ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
K-SNCC: group deviations in subsidized non-cooperative computing
Full text PdfPdf (436 KB)
Source Theoretical Aspects Of Rationality And Knowledge archive
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge table of contents
California
SESSION: Contributed papers table of contents
Pages 174-183  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-560-4
Authors
Andrey Klinger  Technion
Moshe Tennenholtz  Microsoft Israel R&D Center
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 6,   Downloads (12 Months): 10,   Citation Count: 0
Additional Information:

abstract   references   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1562814.1562839
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

A function is subsidized non-cooperative computable [SNCC] if honest agents can compute it by reporting truthfully their private inputs, while unilateral deviations by the players are not beneficial: if a deviation from truth revelation can mislead other agents, this deviation will decrease the deviator's chances of correct computation, or, it will not affect these chances but the expected payment to the deviator will decrease; in addition, deviations can not increase the expected monetary payments to a deviator without decreasing his chances of correct computation. This paper extends the study of SNCC functions to the context of group deviations. A function is K-SNCC if deviations by a group of at most K agents are not beneficial. We provide a full characterization of the K-SNCC functions, both for the independent values and the correlated values settings.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

1
 
2
I. Ashlagi, A. Klinger, and M. Tennenholtz. K-ncc: Stability against group deviations in non-cooperative computation. In WINE, pages 564--569, 2007.
 
3
R. Aumann. Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games. In A. Tucker and R. Luce, editors, Contribution to the Theory of Games, Vol. IV, Annals of Mathematics Studies, 40, pages 287--324. 1959.
4
 
5
A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston, and J. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, 1995.
6
 
7
 
8
R. Smorodinsky and M. Tennenholtz. Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations--the anonymous case. Games and Economic Behavior, 55(2):385--406, May 2006. available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v55y2006i2p385-406.html.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Andrey Klinger: colleagues
Moshe Tennenholtz: colleagues