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A logical characterization of iterated admissibility
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Source Theoretical Aspects Of Rationality And Knowledge archive
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge table of contents
California
SESSION: Contributed papers table of contents
Pages 146-155  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-560-4
Authors
Joseph Y. Halpern  Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
Rafael Pass  Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler provide an epistemic characterization of iterated admissibility (i.e., iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) where uncertainty is represented using LPSs (lexicographic probability sequences). Their characterization holds in a rich structure called a complete structure, where all types are possible. Here, a logical characterization of iterated admissibility is given that involves only standard probability and holds in all structures, not just complete structures. Roughly speaking, our characterization shows that iterated admissibility captures the intuition that "all the agent knows" is that agents satisfy the appropriate rationality assumptions.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
Brandenburger, A., A. Friedenberg, and J. Keisler (2008). Admissibility in games. Econometrica 76(2), 307--352.
 
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Halpern, J. Y. and G. Lakemeyer (2001). Multi-agent only knowing. Journal of Logic and Computation 11(1), 41--70.
 
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Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1994). A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
 
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Pearce, D. G. (1984). Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection. Econometrica 52(4), 1029--1050.
 
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Rajan, U. (1998). Trembles in the Bayesian foundation of solution concepts. Journal of Economic Theory 82, 248--266.
 
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Tan, T. and S. Werlang (1988). The Bayesian foundation of solution concepts of games. Journal of Economic Theory 45(45), 370--391.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Joseph Y. Halpern: colleagues
Rafael Pass: colleagues