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Program equilibria and discounted computation time
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Source Theoretical Aspects Of Rationality And Knowledge archive
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge table of contents
California
SESSION: Contributed papers table of contents
Pages 128-133  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-560-4
Author
Lance Fortnow  Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Tennenholtz (GEB 2004) developed Program Equilibrium to model play in a finite two-player game where each player can base their strategy on the other player's strategies. Tennenholtz's model allowed each player to produce a "loop-free" computer program that had access to the code for both players. He showed a folk theorem where the result of any mixed-strategy individually rational play could be an equilibrium payoff in this model even in a one-shot game. Kalai et al. gave a general folk theorem for correlated play in a more generic commitment model.

We develop a new model of program equilibrium using general computational models and discounting the payoffs based on the computation time used. We give an even more general folk theorem giving correlated-strategy payoffs down to the pure minimax of each player. We also show the existence of equilibrium in other games not covered by the earlier work.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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{Fortnow 08} L. Fortnow. Discounted Time. Computational Complexity Weblog, August 2008. http://tinyurl.com/discountedtime.
 
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{Halpern 08} J. Halpern&R. Pass. Game Theory with Costly Computation. Rapport technique arXiv:0909.0024vl, arXiv, 2008.
 
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{Kalai 07} A. Kalai, E. Kalai, E. Lehrer&D. Samet. A commitment folk theorem. Manuscript., 2007.
 
5
{Kleene 38} S. Kleene. On notation for ordinal numbers. Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 3, pages 150--155, 1938.
 
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{Monderer 06} D. Monderer&M. Tennenholtz. Strong mediated equilibrium. Manuscript., 2006.
 
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{Peters 08} M. Peters&B. Szentes. Definable and contractible contracts. Manuscript., 2008.
 
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{Tennenholtz 04} M. Tennenholtz. Program Equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 49, no. 2, pages 363--373, November 2004.