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Logical omniscience as a computational complexity problem
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Source Theoretical Aspects Of Rationality And Knowledge archive
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge table of contents
California
SESSION: Contributed papers table of contents
Pages 14-23  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-560-4
Authors
Sergei Artemov  CUNY Graduate Center, New York City, NY, United States
Roman Kuznets  Universität Bern, Bern, Switzerland
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

The logical omniscience feature assumes that an epistemic agent knows all logical consequences of her assumptions. This paper offers a general theoretical framework that views logical omniscience as a computational complexity problem. We suggest the following approach: we assume that the knowledge of an agent is represented by an epistemic logical system E; we call such an agent not logically omniscient if for any valid knowledge assertion A of type F is known, a proof of F in E can be found in polynomial time in the size of A. We show that agents represented by major modal logics of knowledge and belief are logically omniscient, whereas agents represented by justification logic systems are not logically omniscient with respect to t is a justification for F.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Sergei Artemov: colleagues
Roman Kuznets: colleagues