Constrained coalitional games

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Constrained coalitional games: formal framework, properties, and complexity results

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International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2 table of contents

Budapest, Hungary

SESSION: Social/organizational aspects table of contents

Pages 1295-1296

Year of Publication: 2009

ISBN:978-0-9817381-7-8

Authors

Gianluigi Greco	University of Calabria, Rende, Italy
Enrico Malizia	University of Calabria, Rende, Italy
Luigi Palopoli	University of Calabria, Rende, Italy
Francesco Scarcello	University of Calabria, Rende, Italy

Sponsors

: The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents
Microsoft Research : Microsoft Research
: Whitestein Technologies
: European Office of Aerospace Research and Development, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, United States Air Force Research Laboratory
: Drexel University
: Wiley -- Blackwell Ltd

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Richland, SC

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ABSTRACT

A general approach to define constrained coalitional games is proposed, i.e., TU games where additional, application-oriented constraints are imposed on the possible outcomes. It is observed that constrained games are succinct NonTransferable (NTU) specifications, which yet retain (some of) the nice properties of the underlying TU games. In fact, a clear picture about the preservation properties of TU solution concepts is depicted, and a thorough analysis is eventually carried out, to assess the impact of issuing constraints on the computational complexity of these solution concepts.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

	1	J. M. Bilbao. Cooperative Games on Combinatorial Structures, Kluwer Academic, Boston, USA, 2000.
	2	E. Malizia, L. Palopoli, and F. Scarcello. Infeasibility certificates and the complexity of the core in coalitional games. Proc. of IJCAI'07, pp. 1402--1407.
	3	M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 1994.