Existence and computation of equilibria of first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids

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Existence and computation of equilibria of first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids

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International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2 table of contents

Budapest, Hungary

SESSION: Interactions table of contents

Pages 1227-1228

Year of Publication: 2009

ISBN:978-0-9817381-7-8

Authors

Guillaume Escamocher	Ecole Normale Supèrieure de Cachan, Paris, France
Peter Bro Miltersen	Aarhus University, Aarhus N, Denmark
Rocio Santillan R.	Aarhus University, Aarhus N, Denmark

Sponsors

: The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents
Microsoft Research : Microsoft Research
: Whitestein Technologies
: European Office of Aerospace Research and Development, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, United States Air Force Research Laboratory
: Drexel University
: Wiley -- Blackwell Ltd

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Richland, SC

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ABSTRACT

We consider existence and computation of symmetric Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) in single-item, sealed-bid, first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids. For the most general case, we show that existence of PSNE is NP-hard. Then, we present algorithmic results for the case of independent valuations and two ways of breaking ties: Vickrey tie-breaking and random tie-breaking.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

	1	A. Blume and P. Heidhues. All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. Journal of Economic Theory, 114(1):170--177, January 2004.
	2	G. Escamocher, P. B. Miltersen, and R. Santillan R. Existence and computation of equilibria of first price auctions with integral valuations and bids. Available at <b>www.daimi.au.dk/~bromille/Papers/first.pdf</b>, 2009.
	3	E. Maskin and J. Riley. Equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions. Review of Econ. Studies, 67(3):439--54, 2000.