Optimal strategies in sequential bidding

ABSTRACT

We are interested in mechanisms that maximize the final social welfare. In [1] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for the public project problem, and in each case social welfare undominated mechanisms in the class of feasible and incentive compatible mechanisms were identified.

REFERENCES

• 1: Krzysztof Apt , Vincent Conitzer , Mingyu Guo , Evangelos Markakis, Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms, Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, December 17-20, 2008, Shanghai, China [doi>10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_48]
• 2: K. R. Apt and A. Estévez-Fernández. Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems, 2008.
• 3: M. Bailey. The demand revealing process: To distribute the surplus. Public Choice, 91(2):107--126, 1997.
• 4: Ruggiero Cavallo, Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments, Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems, May 08-12, 2006, Hakodate, Japan [doi>10.1145/1160633.1160790]
• 5: A. Mas-Collel, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, 1995.

INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  J. Computer Applications
  J.4 SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES