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Self-deceptive decision making: normative and descriptive insights
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International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2 table of contents
Budapest, Hungary
SESSION: Agent reasoning/deliberation/decision mechanisms table of contents
Pages 1113-1120  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-0-9817381-7-8
Authors
Jonathan Y. Ito  USC Institute for Creative Technologies, Marina del Rey, CA
David V. Pynadath  USC Institute for Creative Technologies, Marina del Rey, CA
Stacy C. Marsella  USC Institute for Creative Technologies, Marina del Rey, CA
Sponsors
: The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents
Microsoft Research : Microsoft Research
: Whitestein Technologies
: European Office of Aerospace Research and Development, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, United States Air Force Research Laboratory
: Drexel University
: Wiley -- Blackwell Ltd
Publisher
Bibliometrics
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ABSTRACT

Computational modeling of human belief maintenance and decision-making processes has become increasingly important for a wide range of applications. We present a frame-work for modeling the psychological phenomenon of self-deception in a decision-theoretic framework. Specifically, we model the self-deceptive behavior of wishful thinking as a psychological bias towards the belief in a particularly desirable situation or state. By leveraging the structures and axioms of Expected Utility (EU) Theory we are able to operationalize both the determination and the application of the desired belief state with respect to the decision-making process of expected utility maximization. While we categorize our framework as a descriptive model of human decision making, we show that in certain circumstances the realized expected utility of an action biased by wishful thinking can exceed that of an action motivated purely by the maximization of perceived expected utility. Finally, we show that our framework of self-deception and wishful thinking has the descriptive flexibility to account for the inconsistencies high-lighted by the Common Ratio Effect and the Allais Paradox.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Jonathan Y. Ito: colleagues
David V. Pynadath: colleagues
Stacy C. Marsella: colleagues