Altruism and agents: an argumentation based approach to designing agent decision mechanisms

ABSTRACT

We present an argument-based qualitative decision-making frame-work in which the social values promoted or demoted by alternative action-options are explicitly represented. We show how this framework may be used to explain the results of experimental economic studies in which human subjects play the Ultimatum Game, an interaction between two participants in which one player divides a sum of money between them, and the other player may accept or reject the offer. The results of these experiments are not explained by a decision-model assuming the participants are purely self-interested utility-maximizers. Some studies further suggest that differences in choices made in different cultures may reflect their day to day behaviour, which can in turn be related to the values of the subjects, and how they order their values. The decision-framework we propose will aid software engineers designing decision-making mechanisms for autonomous agents, particularly for situations requiring agent adaptability, for example, where agents may prefer different outcome states in transactions involving different types of counter-parties.

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  I. Computing Methodologies
  I.2 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
        I.2.11 Distributed Artificial Intelligence
            Subjects: Intelligent agents

Additional Classification:
  H. Information Systems
  H.4 INFORMATION SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS
      H.4.2 Types of Systems
          Subjects: Decision support (e.g., MIS)

  I. Computing Methodologies
  I.2 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
        I.2.11 Distributed Artificial Intelligence
            Subjects: Coherence and coordination

General Terms:
Design, Management