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Multiagent reinforcement learning: algorithm converging to Nash equilibrium in general-sum discounted stochastic games
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International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2 table of contents
Budapest, Hungary
SESSION: Multi-agent learning table of contents
Pages 725-732  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-0-9817381-7-8
Author
Natalia Akchurina  University of Paderborn, Paderborn, Germany
Sponsors
: The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents
Microsoft Research : Microsoft Research
: Whitestein Technologies
: European Office of Aerospace Research and Development, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, United States Air Force Research Laboratory
: Drexel University
: Wiley -- Blackwell Ltd
Publisher
Bibliometrics
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ABSTRACT

This paper introduces a multiagent reinforcement learning algorithm that converges with a given accuracy to stationary Nash equilibria in general-sum discounted stochastic games. Under some assumptions we formally prove its convergence to Nash equilibrium in self-play. We claim that it is the first algorithm that converges to stationary Nash equilibrium in the general case.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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