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User modeling in position auctions: re-considering the GSP and VCG mechanisms
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International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1 table of contents
Budapest, Hungary
SESSION: Economic approaches/auctions/mechanism design table of contents
Pages 273-280  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-0-9817381-6-1
Authors
Danny Kuminov  Faculty of Industrial Eng. & Mgmt Technion
Moshe Tennenholtz  Microsoft Israel R&D Center & Mgmt Technion
Sponsors
: The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents
Microsoft Research : Microsoft Research
: Wiley - Blackwell Ltd
: Whitestein Technologies
: European Office of Aerospace Research and Development, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, United States Air Force Research Laboratory
: Drexel University
Publisher
Bibliometrics
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ABSTRACT

We introduce a study of position auctions, with an explicit modeling of user navigation through ads. We refer to our model as the PPA model, since it is most applicable in the context of pay-per-action position auctions. In this model, which is consistent with other recent approaches to user modeling, a typical user searches sequentially over the ordered list of ads. At each point the user has some probability of performing the action associated with the given ad, some probability of moving to the next ad, and some probability of quitting. In the framework of this model, we re-consider two basic mechanisms: the VCG position auction and the generalized second price (GSP) position auction. We study properties of these mechanisms in the context of the PPA model, and in particular show that the GSP position auction possesses a pure strategy equilibrium, and characterize a set of its equilibria. Our main corollary is that the highest revenue one may obtain in an equilibrium of the GSP position auction matches the revenue obtained in the VCG position auction. This suggests that the VCG position auction is preferable to the ad publisher upon the GSP position auction in the context of the PPA position auctions model. The latter is in sharp distinction to the basic result of the usefulness of GSP over VCG in the standard position auctions model, where user behavior is not modeled explicitly. We also study various possibilities for corruption in the PPA setting, and the relative robustness of the mechanisms against the corresponding manipulations.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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H. R. Varian. Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25:1163--1178, 2007.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Danny Kuminov: colleagues
Moshe Tennenholtz: colleagues