Team competition

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Team competition

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International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1 table of contents

Budapest, Hungary

SESSION: Economic approaches/auctions/mechanism design table of contents

Pages 241-248

Year of Publication: 2009

ISBN:978-0-9817381-6-1

Authors

Pingzhong Tang	Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong
Yoav Shoham	Stanford University, California
Fangzhen Lin	Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong

Sponsors

: The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents
Microsoft Research : Microsoft Research
: Wiley - Blackwell Ltd
: Whitestein Technologies
: European Office of Aerospace Research and Development, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, United States Air Force Research Laboratory
: Drexel University

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Richland, SC

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ABSTRACT

In a team competition, two participating teams have an equal number of players, and each team orders its players linearly based on their strengths. A mechanism then specifies how the players from the two teams are matched up and how to score them. There are two types of manipulations by a team: Misreporting the strength ordering and deliberately losing a match. To identify these strategically behaviors, we model the team competition problem in a game-theoretical framework, under which we prove necessary and sufficient conditions which ensure that truthful reporting and maximal effort in matches are equilibrium strategies, and which further ensure certain fairness conditions described by choice functions.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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