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On the complexity of schedule control problems for knockout tournaments
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International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1 table of contents
Budapest, Hungary
SESSION: Economic approaches/auctions/mechanism design table of contents
Pages 225-232  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-0-9817381-6-1
Authors
Thuc Vu  Stanford University, California
Alon Altman  Stanford University, California
Yoav Shoham  Stanford University, California
Sponsors
: The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents
Microsoft Research : Microsoft Research
: Wiley - Blackwell Ltd
: Whitestein Technologies
: European Office of Aerospace Research and Development, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, United States Air Force Research Laboratory
: Drexel University
Publisher
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 15,   Downloads (12 Months): 34,   Citation Count: 0
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ABSTRACT

Knockout tournaments constitute a common format of sporting events, and also model a specific type of election scheme (namely, sequential pairwise elimination election). In such tournaments the designer controls the shape of the tournament (a binary tree) and the seeding of the players (their assignment to the tree leaves). In this paper we investigate the computational complexity of tournament schedule control, i.e., designing a tournament that maximizes the winning probability a target player. We start with a generic probabilistic model consisting of a matrix of pairwise winning probabilities, and then investigate the problem under two types of constraint: constraints on the probability matrix, and constraints on the allowable tournament structure. While the complexity of the general problem is as yet unknown, these various constraints -- all naturally occurring in practice -- serve to push to the problem to one side or the other: easy (polynomial) or hard (NP-complete).


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Thuc Vu: colleagues
Alon Altman: colleagues
Yoav Shoham: colleagues