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xDomain: cross-border proofs of access
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Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies archive
Proceedings of the 14th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies table of contents
Stresa, Italy
SESSION: Multidomain policy integration table of contents
Pages 43-52  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-537-6
Authors
Lujo Bauer  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Limin Jia  University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Michael K. Reiter  University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA
David Swasey  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

A number of research systems have demonstrated the benefits of accompanying each request with a machine-checkable proof that the request complies with access-control policy - a technique called proof-carrying authorization. Numerous authorization logics have been proposed as vehicles by which these proofs can be expressed and checked. A challenge in building such systems is how to allow delegation between institutions that use different authorization logics. Instead of trying to develop the authorization logic that all institutions should use, we propose a framework for interfacing different, mutually incompatible authorization logics. Our framework provides a very small set of primitives that defines an interface for communication between different logics without imposing any fundamental constraints on their design or nature. We illustrate by example that a variety of different logics can communicate over this interface, and show formally that supporting the interface does not impinge on the integrity of each individual logic. We also describe an architecture for constructing authorization proofs that contain components from different logics and report on the performance of a prototype proof checker.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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L. Bauer, S. Garriss, J. M. McCune, M. K. Reiter, J. Rouse, and P. Rutenbar. Device-enabled authorization in the Grey system. In Information Security: 8th International Conference, ISC 2005, volume 3650 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 431--445, Sept. 2005.
 
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L. Bauer, S. Garriss, and M. K. Reiter. Efficient proving for practical distributed access-control systems. In Computer Security-ESORICS 2007: 12th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, volume 4734 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 19--37, Sept. 2007.
 
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L. Bauer, L. Jia, M. K. Reiter, and D. Swasey. xDomain: Cross-border proofs of access. Technical Report CMU-CyLab-09-005, CyLab, Carnegie Mellon University, Mar. 2009.
 
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K. D. Bowers, L. Bauer, D. Garg, F. Pfenning, and M. K. Reiter. Consumable credentials in logic-based access-control systems. In Proceedings of the 2007 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, pages 143--157, Feb. 2007.
 
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D. Garg, L. Bauer, K. D. Bowers, F. Pfenning, and M. K. Reiter. A linear logic of authorization and knowledge. In Computer Security-ESORICS 2006: 11th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, volume 4189 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 297--312, Sept. 2006.
 
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J. Y. Halpern and V. Weissman. Using first-order logic to reason about policies. In Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 187--201, June 2003.
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C. Lesniewski-Laas, B. Ford, J. Strauss, R. Morris, and M. F. Kaashoek. Alpaca, a proof-carrying authentication framework for cryptographic primitives and protocols. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2007.
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The Coq Development Team. The Coq Proof Assistant Reference Manual. LogiCal Project, 2006.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Lujo Bauer: colleagues
Limin Jia: colleagues
Michael K. Reiter: colleagues
David Swasey: colleagues