ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices
Full text PdfPdf (612 KB)
Source
Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the 41st annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Bethesda, MD, USA
SESSION: Crypto I table of contents
Pages 169-178  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-506-2
Author
Craig Gentry  Stanford University, Palo Alto, USA
Sponsors
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 318,   Downloads (12 Months): 3739,   Citation Count: 0
Additional Information:

abstract   references   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1536414.1536440
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

We propose a fully homomorphic encryption scheme -- i.e., a scheme that allows one to evaluate circuits over encrypted data without being able to decrypt. Our solution comes in three steps. First, we provide a general result -- that, to construct an encryption scheme that permits evaluation of arbitrary circuits, it suffices to construct an encryption scheme that can evaluate (slightly augmented versions of) its own decryption circuit; we call a scheme that can evaluate its (augmented) decryption circuit bootstrappable.

Next, we describe a public key encryption scheme using ideal lattices that is almost bootstrappable.

Lattice-based cryptosystems typically have decryption algorithms with low circuit complexity, often dominated by an inner product computation that is in NC1. Also, ideal lattices provide both additive and multiplicative homomorphisms (modulo a public-key ideal in a polynomial ring that is represented as a lattice), as needed to evaluate general circuits.

Unfortunately, our initial scheme is not quite bootstrappable -- i.e., the depth that the scheme can correctly evaluate can be logarithmic in the lattice dimension, just like the depth of the decryption circuit, but the latter is greater than the former. In the final step, we show how to modify the scheme to reduce the depth of the decryption circuit, and thereby obtain a bootstrappable encryption scheme, without reducing the depth that the scheme can evaluate. Abstractly, we accomplish this by enabling the encrypter to start the decryption process, leaving less work for the decrypter, much like the server leaves less work for the decrypter in a server-aided cryptosystem.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

1
2
 
3
 
4
F. Armknecht and A.-R. Sadeghi.A new approach for algebraically homomorphic encryption. Eprint 2008/422.
 
5
6
 
7
D. Beaver.Minimal-latency secure function evaluation. Eurocrypt '00, pp. 335--350.
 
8
 
9
 
10
M. Blaze, G. Bleumer, and M. Strauss. Divertible protocols and atomic proxy cryptography. Eurocrypt '98, LNCS 1403,pp. 127--144.
 
11
D. Boneh, E.-J. Goh, and K. Nissim.Evaluating 2-DNF formulas on ciphertexts. TCC '05, LNCS 3378,pp. 325--341.
 
12
 
13
 
14
 
15
R. Canetti. Personal communication, 2008.
 
16
R. Canetti, H. Krawczyk, and J.B. Nielsen.Relaxing chosen-ciphertext security. Crypto '03,pp. 565--582.
 
17
D. Coppersmith and G. Seroussi. On the minimum distance of some quadratic residue codes. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 30 (1984), 407--411.
 
18
 
19
I. Damgard and M. Jurik. A Length-Flexible Threshold Cryptosystem with Applications. ACISP '03, LNCS 2727,pp. 350--356.
 
20
T. ElGamal.A Public-Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms. Crypto '84,pp. 469--472.
 
21
M. Fellows and N. Koblitz. Combinatorial cryptosystems galore! Contemporary Mathematics,v. 168 of Finite Fields: Theory, Applications, and Algorithms, FQ2,pp. 51--61, 1993.
 
22
S. Goldwasser and D. Kharchenko. Proof of plaintext knowledge for the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem. TCC 2005,pp. 529--555.
23
24
 
25
 
26
Y. Ishai and A. Paskin. Evaluating Branching Programs on Encrypted Data. TCC '07.
 
27
A. Kawachi, K. Tanaka, K. Xagawa. Multi-bit cryptosystems based on lattice problems. PKC '07, LNCS 4450,pp. 315--329.
 
28
A.K. Lenstra, H.W. Lenstra, L. Lovász. Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients. Math. Ann. 261(4) (1982) 515--534.
 
29
F. Levy-dit-Vehel and L. Perret. A Polly Cracker system based on satisfiability. In Coding, Crypt. and Comb., Prog. in Comp.Sci. and App. Logic, v. 23, pp. 177--192.
 
30
L. Ly. A public-key cryptosystem based on Polly Cracker,Ph.D. thesis, Ruhr-Universitat Bochum, Germany, 2002.
 
31
L. Ly. Polly two -- a new algebraic polynomial-based public-key scheme.AAECC, 17(3-4), 2006.
 
32
V. Lyubashevsky and D. Micciancio. Generalized compact knapsacks are collision resistant. ICALP '06.
 
33
V. Lyubashevky and D. Micciancio. Asymptotically efficient lattice-based digital signatures. TCC '08.
 
34
 
35
U. Maurer and D. Raub. Black-Box Extension Fields and the Inexistence of Field-Homomorphic One-Way Permutations. Asiacrypt '07,pp. 427--443.
 
36
C.A. Melchor, G. Castagnos, and P. Gaborit. Lattice-based homomorphic encryption of vector spaces. ISIT '08,pp. 1858--1862.
 
37
C.A. Melchor, P. Gaborit, and J. Herranz. Additive Homomorphic Encryption with t-Operand Multiplications. Eprint 2008/378.
38
 
39
40
 
41
42
 
43
 
44
 
45
A.M. Odlyzko. The rise and fall of knapsack cryptosystems. In Crypt. and Comp. Num. Th., Proc. Sympos. Appl. Math., vol. 42, AMS, 1990, pp. 75--88.
 
46
T. Okamoto and Uchiyama. A New Public-Key Cryptosystem as Secure as Factoring. Eurocrypt '98, LNCS 1403,pp. 308--318.
 
47
P. Paillier. Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes. Eurocrypt '99,pp. 223--238.
 
48
C. Peikert and A. Rosen. Efficient collision-resistant hashing from worst-case assumptions on cyclic lattices. TCC '06,pp. 145--166.
49
50
 
51
B. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner. Attacks on protocols for server-aided RSA computation. Eurocrypt '92, LNCS 658,pp. 153--162.
 
52
53
 
54
R. Rivest, L. Adleman, and M. Dertouzos. On data banks and privacy homomorphisms. In Foundations of Secure Computation, pp. 169--180, 1978.
55
 
56
 
57
 
58