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Confidentiality-preserving distributed proofs of conjunctive queries
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ASIAN ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security table of contents
Sydney, Australia
SESSION: Security policies and verification table of contents
Pages 287-297  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-394-5
Authors
Adam J. Lee  University of Pittsburgh
Kazuhiro Minami  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Nikita Borisov  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Distributed proof construction protocols have been shown to be valuable for reasoning about authorization decisions in open distributed environments such as pervasive computing spaces. Unfortunately, existing distributed proof protocols offer only limited support for protecting the confidentiality of sensitive facts, which limits their utility in many practical scenarios. In this paper, we propose a distributed proof construction protocol in which the release of a fact's truth value can be made contingent upon facts managed by other principals in the system. We formally prove that our protocol can safely prove conjunctions of facts without leaking the truth values of individual facts, even in the face of colluding adversaries and fact release policies with cyclical dependencies. This facilitates the definition of context-sensitive release policies that enable the conditional use of sensitive facts in distributed proofs.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Adam J. Lee: colleagues
Kazuhiro Minami: colleagues
Nikita Borisov: colleagues