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Multi-aspect profiling of kernel rootkit behavior
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European Conference on Computer Systems archive
Proceedings of the 4th ACM European conference on Computer systems table of contents
Nuremberg, Germany
SESSION: Defending against bad things table of contents
Pages 47-60  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-482-9
Authors
Ryan Riley  Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
Xuxian Jiang  North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA
Dongyan Xu  Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
Sponsor
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Kernel rootkits, malicious software designed to compromise a running operating system kernel, are difficult to analyze and profile due to their elusive nature, the variety and complexity of their behavior, and the privilege level at which they run. However, a comprehensive kernel rootkit profile that reveals key aspects of the rootkit's behavior is helpful in aiding a detailed manual analysis by a human expert. In this paper we present PoKeR, a kernel rootkit profiler capable of producing multi-aspect rootkit profiles which include the revelation of rootkit hooking behavior, the exposure of targeted kernel objects (both static and dynamic), assessment of user-level impacts, as well as the extraction of kernel rootkit code. The system is designed to be deployed in scenarios which can tolerate high overheads, such as honeypots. Our evaluation results with a number of real-world kernel rootkits show that PoKeR is able to accurately profile a variety of rootkits ranging from traditional ones with system call hooking to more advanced ones with direct kernel object manipulation. The obtained profiles lead to unique insights into the rootkits' characteristics and demonstrate PoKeR's usefulness as a tool for rootkit investigators.


REFERENCES

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Ryan Riley: colleagues
Xuxian Jiang: colleagues
Dongyan Xu: colleagues