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It's not what you know, but who you know: a social approach to last-resort authentication
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Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems archive
Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Human factors in computing systems table of contents
Boston, MA, USA
SESSION: Security and privacy table of contents
Pages 1983-1992  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-246-7
Authors
Stuart Schechter  Microsoft Research, Redmond, WA, USA
Serge Egelman  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Robert W. Reeder  Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA
Sponsors
SIGCHI: ACM Special Interest Group on Computer-Human Interaction
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Backup authentication mechanisms help users who have forgotten their passwords regain access to their accounts-or at least try. Today's systems fall short in meeting both security and reliability requirements. We designed, built, and tested a new backup authentication system that employs a social-authentication mechanism. The system employs trustees previously appointed by the account holder to verify the account holder's identity. We ran three experiments to determine whether the system could (1) reliably authenticate account holders, (2) resist email attacks that target trustees by impersonating account holders, and (3) resist phone-based attacks from individuals close to account holders. Results were encouraging: seventeen of the nineteen participants who made the effort to call trustees authenticated successfully. However, we also found that users must be reminded of who their trustees are. While email-based attacks were largely unsuccessful, stronger countermeasures will be required to counter highly-personalized phone-based attacks.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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S. Schechter, A. J. Bernheim Brush, and S. Egelman. Its no secret: Measuring the security and reliability of authentication via 'secret' questions. In submission.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Stuart Schechter: colleagues
Serge Egelman: colleagues
Robert W. Reeder: colleagues