ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Securing frame communication in browsers
Full text Digital EditionDigital Edition HtmlHtml (3 KB),  PdfPdf (2.95 MB)
Source
Communications of the ACM archive
Volume 52 ,  Issue 6  (June 2009) table of contents
One Laptop Per Child: Vision vs. Reality
SECTION: Research highlights table of contents
Pages 83-91  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISSN:0001-0782
Authors
Adam Barth  UC Berkeley
Collin Jackson  Stanford University
John C. Mitchell  Stanford University
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 46,   Downloads (12 Months): 347,   Citation Count: 0
Additional Information:

abstract   references   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1516046.1516066
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

Many Web sites embed third-party content in frames, relying on the browser's security policy to protect against malicious content. However, frames provide insufficient isolation in browsers that let framed content navigate other frames. We evaluate existing frame navigation policies and advocate a stricter policy, which we deploy in the open-source browsers. In addition to preventing undesirable interactions, the browser's strict isolation policy also affects communication between cooperating frames. We therefore analyze two techniques for interframe communication between isolated frames. The first method, fragment identifier messaging, initially provides confidentiality without authentication, which we repair using concepts from a well-known network protocol. The second method, <code>postMessage</code>, initially provides authentication, but we discover an attack that breaches confidentiality. We propose improvements in the <code>postMessage</code> API to provide confidentiality; our proposal has been standardized and adopted in browser implementations.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
Burke, J. Cross domain frame communication with fragment identifiers. http://tagneto.blogspot.com/2006/06/cross-domain-frame-communication-with.html.
 
2
Crockford, D. The <module> tag. http://www.json.org/module.html.
 
3
4
 
5
Eich, B. JavaScript: Mobility and ubiquity. http://kathrin.dagstuhl.de/files/Materials/07/07091/07091EichBrendan.Slides.pdf.
 
6
Felten, E.W., Balfanz, D., Dean, D., Wallach, D.S. Web spoofing: An Internet con game. In Proceedings of the 20th National Information Systems Security Conference (1996).
 
7
Guninski, G. Frame spoofing using loading two frames. Mozilla Bug 13871.
 
8
Hickson, I. Re: A potential slight security enhancement to postMessage, Februrary 2008. http://lists.whatwg.org/pipermail/whatwg-whatwg.org/2008-February/013949.html.
 
9
Hickson, I. Re: HTML5 frame navigation policy, April 2008. http://lists.whatwg.org/pipermail/whatwg-whatwg.org/2008-April/014597.html.
 
10
Hickson, I. et al. HTML 5 Working Draft, http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/.
 
11
Jackson, C., Barth, A. Beware of finer-grained origins. In Proceedings of the Web 2.0 Security and Privacy (W2SP) (2008).
12
13
14
 
15
 
16
Microsoft. SECURITY attribute (FRAME, IFRAME). http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms534622(VS.85.)aspx.
17
 
18
Ross, D., January 2008. Personal communication.
 
19
Ruderman, J. JavaScript Security: Same Origin, http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/components/same-origin.html.
 
20
Stuttard, D., Pinto, M. The Web Application Hacker's Handbook. Wiley, 2007.
 
21
Thorpe, D. Secure cross-domain communication in the browser. Archit. J. 12 (2007), 14--18.
22

Collaborative Colleagues:
Adam Barth: colleagues
Collin Jackson: colleagues
John C. Mitchell: colleagues