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Collaborative authentication in unattended WSNs
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Conference On Wireless Network Security archive
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Wireless network security table of contents
Zurich, Switzerland
SESSION: Sensor network security II table of contents
Pages 237-244  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-460-7
Authors
Roberto Di Pietro  Università di Roma Tre, Rome, Italy
Claudio Soriente  University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
Angelo Spognardi  INRIA Rhône-Alpes, Montbonnot, France
Gene Tsudik  University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

An unattended wireless sensor network (UWSN) might collect valuable data representing an attractive target for the adversary. Since a sink visits the network infrequently, unattended sensors cannot immediately off-load data to some safe external entity. With sufficient time between sink visits, a powerful mobile adversary can easily compromise sensor-collected data.

In this paper, we propose two schemes (CoMAC and ExCo) that leverage sensor co-operation to achieve data authentication. These schemes use standard (and inexpensive) symmetric cryptographic primitives coupled with key evolution and few messages exchange. We provide security analysis for proposed schemes and assess their effectiveness via simulations. We show that proposed schemes cope well with real WSN issues, such as message loss and sensor failure. We also compare the two schemes with respect to robustness and overhead, which allows network designers to carefully select the right scheme and tune appropriate system parameters.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Roberto Di Pietro: colleagues
Claudio Soriente: colleagues
Angelo Spognardi: colleagues
Gene Tsudik: colleagues