| Collaborative authentication in unattended WSNs |
| Full text |
Pdf
(403 KB)
|
Source
|
Conference On Wireless Network Security
archive
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Wireless network security
table of contents
Zurich, Switzerland
SESSION: Sensor network security II
table of contents
Pages 237-244
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-460-7
|
|
Authors
|
|
Roberto Di Pietro
|
Università di Roma Tre, Rome, Italy
|
|
Claudio Soriente
|
University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
|
|
Angelo Spognardi
|
INRIA Rhône-Alpes, Montbonnot, France
|
|
Gene Tsudik
|
University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
|
|
| Sponsors |
|
| Publisher |
|
| Bibliometrics |
Downloads (6 Weeks): 51, Downloads (12 Months): 236, Citation Count: 0
|
|
|
ABSTRACT
An unattended wireless sensor network (UWSN) might collect valuable data representing an attractive target for the adversary. Since a sink visits the network infrequently, unattended sensors cannot immediately off-load data to some safe external entity. With sufficient time between sink visits, a powerful mobile adversary can easily compromise sensor-collected data. In this paper, we propose two schemes (CoMAC and ExCo) that leverage sensor co-operation to achieve data authentication. These schemes use standard (and inexpensive) symmetric cryptographic primitives coupled with key evolution and few messages exchange. We provide security analysis for proposed schemes and assess their effectiveness via simulations. We show that proposed schemes cope well with real WSN issues, such as message loss and sensor failure. We also compare the two schemes with respect to robustness and overhead, which allows network designers to carefully select the right scheme and tune appropriate system parameters.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
| |
1
|
K. Akkaya and M. F. Younis. A survey on routing protocols for wireless sensor networks. Ad Hoc Networks, 3(3):325--349, 2005.
|
| |
2
|
|
| |
3
|
M. Bellare and B. Yee. Forward Integrity for Secure Audit Logs. UCSD CSE Dept. Technical Report 23, 1997.
|
 |
4
|
|
| |
5
|
|
| |
6
|
|
| |
7
|
R. Di Pietro, L. Mancini, C. Soriente, A. Spognardi, and G. Tsudik. Playing hide-and-seek with a focused mobile adversary. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/293, 2008.
|
| |
8
|
Y. Dodis, M. Franklin, J. Katz, A. Miyaji, and M. Yung. A generic construction for intrusion-resilient public key encryption. In CT-RSA, 2004.
|
| |
9
|
|
| |
10
|
|
 |
11
|
|
| |
12
|
G. Itkis. Intrusion-resilient signatures: Generic constructions. In SCN, 2002.
|
| |
13
|
|
| |
14
|
|
| |
15
|
|
| |
16
|
|
 |
17
|
Adrian Perrig , Robert Szewczyk , Victor Wen , David Culler , J. D. Tygar, SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks, Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking, p.189-199, July 2001, Rome, Italy
[doi> 10.1145/381677.381696]
|
 |
18
|
Hao Yang , Fan Ye , Yuan Yuan , Songwu Lu , William Arbaugh, Toward resilient security in wireless sensor networks, Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing, May 25-27, 2005, Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA
[doi> 10.1145/1062689.1062696]
|
| |
19
|
F. Ye, H. Luo, S. Lu, and L. Zhang. Statistical en-route filtering of injected false data in sensor networks. In IEEE INFOCOM, 2004.
|
| |
20
|
W. Zhang and G. Cao. Group rekeying for filtering false data in sensor networks: a predistribution and local collaboration-based approach. In IEEE INFOCOM, 2005.
|
| |
21
|
Y. Zhang, J. Yang, and H. T. Vu. The interleaved authentication for filtering false reports in multipath routing based sensor networks. In IPDPS, 2006.
|
 |
22
|
|
|