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Mitigating control-channel jamming attacks in multi-channel ad hoc networks
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Conference On Wireless Network Security archive
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Wireless network security table of contents
Zurich, Switzerland
SESSION: Jamming/anti-jamming table of contents
Pages 169-180  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-460-7
Authors
Loukas Lazos  University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
Sisi Liu  University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
Marwan Krunz  University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We address the problem of control-channel jamming attacks in multi-channel ad hoc networks. Deviating from the traditional view that sees jamming attacks as a physical-layer vulnerability, we consider a sophisticated adversary who exploits knowledge of the protocol mechanics along with cryptographic quantities extracted from compromised nodes to maximize the impact of his attack on higher-layer functions. We propose new security metrics that quantify the ability of the adversary to deny access to the control channel, and the overall delay incurred in re-establishing the control channel. We also propose a randomized distributed scheme that allows nodes to establish a new control channel using frequency hopping. Our method differs from classic frequency hopping in that no two nodes share the same hopping sequence, thus mitigating the impact of node compromise. Furthermore, a compromised node is uniquely identified through its hop sequence, leading to its isolation from any future information regarding the frequency location of the control channel.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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X. Liu, G. Noubir, R. Sundaram, and S. Tan, "Spread: Foiling Smart Jammers Using Multi--layer Agility," INFOCOM Mini Symposium, 2007.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Loukas Lazos: colleagues
Sisi Liu: colleagues
Marwan Krunz: colleagues