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Link-layer protection in 802.11i WLANS with dummy authentication
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Conference On Wireless Network Security archive
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Wireless network security table of contents
Zurich, Switzerland
SESSION: WiFi and mesh network security table of contents
Pages 131-138  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-460-7
Authors
Zhimin Yang  The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
Adam C. Champion  The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
Boxuan Gu  The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
Xiaole Bai  The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
Dong Xuan  The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

The current 802.11i standard can provide data confidentiality, integrity and mutual authentication in enterprise Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). However, secure communication can only be provided after successful authentication and a robust security network association is established. In general, the wireless link layer is not protected by the current standard in WLANs, which leads to many possible attacks, especially in public open-access wireless networks. We argue that regardless of the type of network under consideration, link-layer protection and data confidentiality are of great importance in wireless applications. In this paper, we first identify and analyze the security issues ignored by the current 802.11 security standard. Then we propose our solution to patch the current 802.11i standard and address all those issues with a new dummy authentication key-establishment algorithm. Dummy means no real authentication for a user. In dummy authentication, we apply public-key cryptography's key-establishment technique to the 802.11 MAC protocol. Our solution can provide link-layer data encryption in open-access wireless networks, separate session encryption keys for different users, and protection for important frames such as management and null data frames as well as Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) messages.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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D. Akin. 802.11w -- Management Frame Protection. http://www.cwnp.com/community/index2.php?option=com content&do pdf=1&id=54.
 
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J.-C. Chen, M.-C. Jiang, and Y. wen Liu. Wireless LAN Security and IEEE 802.11i. IEEE Wireless Communications, 12(1):27--36, Feb. 2005.
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C. He and J. C. Mitchell. Security Analysis and Improvements for IEEE 802.11i. In 12th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS '05), pp. 90--110, Feb. 2005 .
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E. Tews, R.-P. Weinmann, and A. Pyshki. Breaking 104-bit WEP in Less Than 60 Seconds. Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2007/120, available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/120, 2007.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Zhimin Yang: colleagues
Adam C. Champion: colleagues
Boxuan Gu: colleagues
Xiaole Bai: colleagues
Dong Xuan: colleagues