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Privacy-preserving 802.11 access-point discovery
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Conference On Wireless Network Security archive
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Wireless network security table of contents
Zurich, Switzerland
SESSION: WiFi and mesh network security table of contents
Pages 123-130  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-460-7
Authors
Janne Lindqvist  Helsinki University of Technology (TKK), Espoo, Finland
Tuomas Aura  Microsoft Research, Cambridge, United Kingdom
George Danezis  Microsoft Research, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Teemu Koponen  Helsinki Institute for Information Technology (HIIT), Espoo, Finland
Annu Myllyniemi  Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland
Jussi Mäki  Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland
Michael Roe  Microsoft Research, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

It is usual for 802.11 WLAN clients to probe actively for access points in order to hasten AP discovery and to find "hidden" APs. These probes reveal the client's list of preferred networks, thus, present a privacy risk: an eavesdropper can infer attributes of the client based on its associations with networks. We propose an access-point discovery protocol that supports fast discovery and hidden networks while also preserving privacy. Our solution is incrementally deployable, efficient, requires only small modifications to current client and AP implementations, interoperates with current networks, and does not change the user experience. We note that our solution is faster than the standard hidden-network discovery protocol based on measurements on a prototype implementation.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Janne Lindqvist: colleagues
Tuomas Aura: colleagues
George Danezis: colleagues
Teemu Koponen: colleagues
Annu Myllyniemi: colleagues
Jussi Mäki: colleagues
Michael Roe: colleagues