RFID-based supply chain partner authentication and key agreement

ABSTRACT

The growing use of RFID in supply chains brings along an indisputable added value from the business perspective, but raises a number of new interesting security challenges. One of them is the authentication of two participants of the supply chain that have possessed the same tagged item, but that have otherwise never communicated before. The situation is even more complex if we imagine that participants to the supply chain may be business competitors. We present a novel cryptographic scheme that solves this problem. In our solution, users exchange tags over the cycle of a supply chain and, if two entities have possessed the same tag, they agree on a secret common key they can use to protect their exchange of business sensitive information. No rogue user can be successful in a malicious authentication, because it would either be traceable or it would imply the loss of a secret key, which provides a strong incentive to keep the tag authentication information secret and protects the integrity of the supply chain. We provide game-based security proofs of our claims, without relying on the random oracle model.

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  D. Software
  D.4 OPERATING SYSTEMS
      D.4.6 Security and Protection
          Subjects: Cryptographic controls

Additional Classification:
  C. Computer Systems Organization
  C.2 COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
      C.2.2 Network Protocols
          Subjects: Applications (SMTP, FTP, etc.)

General Terms:
Algorithms, Security

Keywords:
authentication, key agreement, proof of possession, rfid, supply chain