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TVA: a DoS-limiting network architecture
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Source IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON) archive
Volume 16 ,  Issue 6  (December 2008) table of contents
Pages 1267-1280  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISSN:1063-6692
Authors
Xiaowei Yang  University of California, Irvine, CA
David Wetherall  University of Washington and Intel Research Seattle, Seattle, WA
Thomas Anderson  Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, WA
Publisher
IEEE Press  Piscataway, NJ, USA
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DOI Bookmark: 10.1109/TNET.2007.914506

ABSTRACT

We motivate the capability approach to network denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and evaluate the Traffic Validation Architecture (TVA) architecture which builds on capabilities. With our approach, rather than send packets to any destination at any time, senders must first obtain "permission to send" from the receiver, which provides the permission in the form of capabilities to those senders whose traffic it agrees to accept. The senders then include these capabilities in packets. This enables verification points distributed around the network to check that traffic has been authorized by the receiver and the path in between, and hence to cleanly discard unauthorized traffic. To evaluate this approach, and to understand the detailed operation of capabilities, we developed a network architecture called TVA. TVA addresses a wide range of possible attacks against communication between pairs of hosts, including spoofed packet floods, network and host bottlenecks, and router state exhaustion. We use simulations to show the effectiveness of TVA at limiting DoS floods, and an implementation on Click router to evaluate the computational costs of TVA. We also discuss how to incrementally deploy TVA into practice.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Xiaowei Yang: colleagues
David Wetherall: colleagues
Thomas Anderson: colleagues