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Universally Composable RFID Identification and Authentication Protocols
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ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) archive
Volume 12 ,  Issue 4  (April 2009) table of contents
Article No. 21  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISSN:1094-9224
Authors
Mike Burmester  Florida State University
Tri Van Le  Google, Inc.
Breno De Medeiros  Google, Inc.
Gene Tsudik  University of California
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
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ABSTRACT

As the number of RFID applications grows, concerns about their security and privacy become greatly amplified. At the same time, the acutely restricted and cost-sensitive nature of RFID tags rules out simple reuse of traditional security/privacy solutions and calls for a new generation of extremely lightweight identification and authentication protocols.

This article describes a universally composable security framework designed especially for RFID applications. We adopt RFID-specific setup, communication, and concurrency assumptions in a model that guarantees strong security, privacy, and availability properties. In particular, the framework supports modular deployment, which is most appropriate for ubiquitous applications. We also describe a set of simple, efficient, secure, and anonymous (untraceable) RFID identification and authentication protocols that instantiate the proposed framework. These protocols involve minimal interaction between tags and readers and place only a small computational load on the tag, and a light computational burden on the back-end server. We show that our protocols are provably secure within the proposed framework.


REFERENCES

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Mike Burmester: colleagues
Tri Van Le: colleagues
Breno De Medeiros: colleagues
Gene Tsudik: colleagues