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A direct path to dependable software
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Communications of the ACM archive
Volume 52 ,  Issue 4  (April 2009) table of contents
A Direct Path to Dependable Software
SECTION: Review articles table of contents
Pages 78-88  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISSN:0001-0782
Author
Daniel Jackson  MIT's Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab, Cambridge, MA
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Who could fault an approach that offers greater credibility at reduced cost?


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Gallaher, M. and Kropp, B. Economic Impacts of Inadequate Infrastructure for Software Testing, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002.
 
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Jackson, D. Dependable software by design. Scientific American (June 2006); www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=dependable-software-by-de&collD=l.
 
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Jackson, D., Thomas, M., and Millett, L., Eds. Software For Dependable Systems: Sufficient Evidence? National Research Council. National Academies Press, 2007; books.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309103940.
 
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Maisel, W., Sweeney, M., Stevenson, W., Ellison, K., and Epstein, L. Recalls and safety alerts involving pacemakers and implantable cardioverter-defibrillator generators. Journal of the American Medical Association 286, 7 (Aug. 15, 2001).
 
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Rockoff, J. Flaws in medical coding can kill: Spread of computers creates new dangers, FDA officials warn. Baltimore Sun (June 30, 2008); http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/baltsun/access/1502776681.html?dids=1502776681:1502776681&FMT=ABS&FMTS=A BS:FT&type=current&date=Jun+30%2C+2008&aut hor=Jonathan+D.+Rockoff&pub=The+Sun&desc=FL AWS+IN+MEDICAL+CODING+CAN+KILL.
 
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