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Making secure processors OS- and performance-friendly
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ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization (TACO) archive
Volume 5 ,  Issue 4  (March 2009) table of contents
Article No. 16  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISSN:1544-3566
Authors
Siddhartha Chhabra  North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC
Brian Rogers  North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC
Yan Solihin  North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC
Milos Prvulovic  Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In today's digital world, computer security issues have become increasingly important. In particular, researchers have proposed designs for secure processors that utilize hardware-based memory encryption and integrity verification to protect the privacy and integrity of computation even from sophisticated physical attacks. However, currently proposed schemes remain hampered by problems that make them impractical for use in today's computer systems: lack of virtual memory and Inter-Process Communication support as well as excessive storage and performance overheads. In this article, we propose (1) address independent seed encryption (AISE), a counter-mode-based memory encryption scheme using a novel seed composition, and (2) bonsai Merkle trees (BMT), a novel Merkle tree-based memory integrity verification technique, to eliminate these system and performance issues associated with prior counter-mode memory encryption and Merkle tree integrity verification schemes. We present both a qualitative discussion and a quantitative analysis to illustrate the advantages of our techniques over previously proposed approaches in terms of complexity, feasibility, performance, and storage. Our results show that AISE+BMT reduces the overhead of prior memory encryption and integrity verification schemes from 12% to 2% on average for single-threaded benchmarks on uniprocessor systems, and from 15% to 4% for coscheduled benchmarks on multicore systems while eliminating critical system-level problems.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Siddhartha Chhabra: colleagues
Brian Rogers: colleagues
Yan Solihin: colleagues
Milos Prvulovic: colleagues