ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Equilibria of atomic flow games are not unique
Full text PdfPdf (448 KB)
Source Symposium on Discrete Algorithms archive
Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual ACM -SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms table of contents
New York, New York
Pages 748-757  
Year of Publication: 2009
Authors
Umang Bhaskar  Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH
Lisa Fleischer  Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH
Darrell Hoy  Dartmouth College
Chien-Chung Huang  Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik, Saarbrücken, Germany
Publisher
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics  Philadelphia, PA, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 2,   Downloads (12 Months): 56,   Citation Count: 1
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Review this Article  

ABSTRACT

In routing games with infinitesimal players, it follows from well-known convexity arguments that equilibria exist and are unique (up to induced delays, and under weak assumptions on delay functions). In routing games with players that control large amounts of flow, uniqueness has been demonstrated only in limited cases: in 2-terminal, nearly-parallel graphs; when all players control exactly the same amount of flow; when latency functions are polynomials of degree at most three.

In this work, we answer an open question posed by Cominetti, Correa, and Stier-Moses (ICALP 2006) and show that there may be multiple equilibria in atomic player routing games. We demonstrate this multiplicity via two specific examples. In addition, we show our examples are topologically minimal by giving a complete characterization of the class of network topologies for which unique equilibria exist. Our proofs and examples are based on a novel characterization of these topologies in terms of sets of circulations.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
Eitan Altman, Tamer Basar, Tania Jimenez, and Nahum Shimkin. Competitive routing in networks with polynomial costs. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 47(1):92--96, January 2002.
 
2
Stefano Catoni and Stefano Pallottino. Traffic equilibrium paradoxes. Transportation Science, 25(3):240--244, August 1991.
 
3
Roberto Cominetti, Jose R. Correa, and N. E. Stier-Moses. The impact of oligopolistic competition in networks. Operation Research, 2008. to appear, extended abstract entitled "Network games with atomic players" appeared in ICALP 06.
 
4
P. Harker. Multiple equilibrium behaviors on networks. Transportation Science, 22(1):39--46, 1988.
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
T. Nishizeki and N. Chiba. Planar Graphs: Theory and Algorithms. North-Holland, 1988.
 
9
J. Nocedal and S. T. Wright. Numerical Optimization. Springer, 2006.
 
10
 
11
 
12
 
13
 
14
15
 
16
 
17
H. R. von Stackelberg. Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Springer-Verlag, 1934. English translation entitled as Market Structure and Equilibrium, published in 1952 by Oxford University Press.
 
18
J. G. Wardrop. Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research. In Proc. Institute of Civil Engineers, Pt. II, volume 1, pages 325--378, 1952.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Umang Bhaskar: colleagues
Lisa Fleischer: colleagues
Darrell Hoy: colleagues
Chien-Chung Huang: colleagues