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ABSTRACT
We investigate the problem of incentivizing an expert to truthfully reveal probabilistic information about a random event. Probabilistic information consists of one or more properties, which are any real-valued functions of the distribution, such as the mean and variance. Not all properties can be elicited truthfully. We provide a simple characterization of elicitable properties, and describe the general form of the associated payment functions that induce truthful revelation. We then consider sets of properties, and observe that all properties can be inferred from sets of elicitable properties. This suggests the concept of elicitation complexity for a property, the size of the smallest set implying the property. REFERENCES
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