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Protection: principles and practice
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Source AFIPS Joint Computer Conferences archive
Proceedings of the November 16-18, 1971, fall joint computer conference table of contents
Las Vegas, Nevada
SESSION: Operating system design concepts table of contents
Pages 417-429  
Year of Publication: 1971
Authors
G. Scott Graham  Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey
Peter J. Denning  Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey
Sponsor
AFIPS : American Federation of Information Processing Societies
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 8,   Downloads (12 Months): 80,   Citation Count: 7
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abstract   references   cited by   collaborative colleagues  

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ABSTRACT

The protection mechanisms of computer systems control the access to objects, especially information objects. The range of responsibilities of these mechanisms includes at one extreme completely isolating executing programs from each other, and at the other extreme permitting complete cooperation and shared access among executing programs. Within this range one can identify at least seven levels at which protection mechanisms can be conceived as being required, each level being more difficult than its predecessor to implement:

1. No sharing at all (complete isolation).

2. Sharing copies of programs or data files.

3. Sharing originals of programs or data files.

4. Sharing programming systems or subsystems.

5. Permitting the cooperation of mutually suspicious subsystems---e.g., as with debugging or proprietary subsystems.

6. Providing "memoryless" subsystems---i.e., systems which, having performed their tasks, are guaranteed to have kept no secret record of the task performed (an income-tax computing service, for example, must be allowed to keep billing information on its use by customers but not to store information secretly on customers' incomes).

7. Providing "certified" subsystems---i.e., those whose correctness has been completely validated and is guaranteed a priori.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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P Brinch-Hansen (Ed) RC-4000 software multiprogramming system A/S Regnecentralen Copenhagen April 1969
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R S Fabry Preliminary description of a supervisor for a machine oriented around capabilities ICR Quarterly Report 18 University of Chicago August 1968 Section I pp 1--97
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G S Graham Protection structures in operating systems MSc Thesis Department of Computer Science University of Toronto August 1971
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IBM System/360 operating system concepts and facilities IBM Report No GC28-6535 November 1968
 
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IBM System/360 principles of operation IBM Report No GA22-6821 September 1968
 
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IBM System/370 principles of operation IBM Report No GA22-7000 June 1970
 
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B W Lampson On reliable and extendable operating systems Techniques in software engineering NATO Science Committee Working Material Vol II September 1969
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B W Lampson Protection Proc Fifth Annual Princeton Conference on Information Sciences and Systems Department of Electrical Engineering Princeton University Princeton New Jersey 08540 March 1971 pp 437--443
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CITED BY  7
Collaborative Colleagues:
G. Scott Graham: colleagues
Peter J. Denning: colleagues