ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Protection of complex distributed systems
Full text PdfPdf (126 KB)
Source Middleware Conference archive
Proceedings of the 2008 workshop on Middleware security table of contents
Leuven, Belgium
Pages 7-12  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-363-1
Authors
Rudolf Schreiner  St John's Innovation Centre, Cambridge, UK
Ulrich Lang  St John's Innovation Centre, Cambridge, UK
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 19,   Downloads (12 Months): 204,   Citation Count: 0
Additional Information:

abstract   references   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1463342.1463344
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

Today, the challenge in security of complex distributed systems does not anymore lie in encryption or access control of a single middleware platform, but in the protection of the system as a whole. This includes the definition of correct security policies at various abstraction layers, and also the unified and correct management and enforcement of the correct security policy at all relevant places in the system. As the authors have learned in the development of even comparatively simple distributed systems, e.g. an Air Traffic Control simulation system, this is not possible anymore by a manual definition of encryption properties and access control rules. Human security administrators are not able to define all the fine grained rules with sufficient assurance, to distribute them to all Policy Enforcement Points and to check many log files or admin consoles. This is especially impossible in highly distributed and agile service oriented or data driven systems.

In this paper, the authors describe an integrated approach to protect such complex and heterogeneous systems. It is based on Model Driven Security to generate high assurance security policies, rules and configurations from the system's functional model and a high level security policy, and the OpenPMF Policy Management Framework to manage and to correctly enforce the security policy in the system.

As a proof of concept, the protection of a prototypical implementation of System Wide Information Management (SWIM) in Air Traffic Management is briefly described.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
House of Representatives, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 24 Jul 2002
 
2
Public Law 104--191: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 21. Aug 1996
 
3
 
4
FAA SWIM web site, www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_officies_ato_service_units_techops/swim, 2008
 
5
EU FP6 SWIM-SUIT Consortium project homepage, www.swim-suit.aero, 2008
 
6
EU FP6 SWIM-SUIT Consortium, Project Deliverable 1.4.1, 2008
 
7
NSA, Global Information Grid website, www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/gig.cfm, 2008
 
8
Schreiner, R, Lang, U, Ritter, T, Reznik, J, Building Secure and Interoperable ATC Systems, Eurocontrol INO Workshop 2006
 
9
Lang, Ulrich and Schreiner, Rudolf: Integrated IT Security: Air-Traffic Management Case Study. ISSE 2005 Conference Budapest, Springer, 2005
 
10
Model Driven Security web site, www.modeldrivensecurity.org, 2008
 
11
ObjectSecurity: OpenPMF 2.0 Model Driven Security Management, www.openpmf.com, 2008
 
12
OASIS Consortium: XACML 2.0 Core: eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) Version 2.0, 1 Feb 2005
 
13
AD4 consortium, AD4 EU FP6 project homepage: www.ad4-project.com
 
14
ObjectSecurity. SimulateWorld information webpage. www.simulateworld.com

Collaborative Colleagues:
Rudolf Schreiner: colleagues
Ulrich Lang: colleagues