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Enforcing "sticky" security policies throughout a distributed application
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Source Middleware Conference archive
Proceedings of the 2008 workshop on Middleware security table of contents
Leuven, Belgium
Pages: 1-6  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-363-1
Authors
David W. Chadwick  University of Kent, Canterbury, UK
Stijn F. Lievens  University of Kent, Canterbury, UK
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 10,   Downloads (12 Months): 101,   Citation Count: 3
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ABSTRACT

Existing policy enforcement points (PEPs) typically call a local policy decision point (PDP) running at the local site, either embedded in the application, or running as a local stand alone service. In distributed applications, the PDPs at each site do not usually coordinate decision making amongst themselves, and do not pass policies between themselves. Thus it becomes very difficult to enforce "sticky" policies such as privacy policies and obligations at all the sites in a distributed application. This paper looks at different ways in which the PEPs and PDPs of a distributed application may share policies between themselves so as to enforce "sticky" policies throughout a distributed application. Three alternative models are described, the Application Protocol Enhancement Model, the Encapsulating Security Layer Model and the Back Channel Model. The strengths and weaknesses of the three models are evaluated, and we compare them to prior research in the field.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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ITU-T Rec X.812 (1995) | ISO/IEC 10181-3:1996 "Security Frameworks for open systems: Access control framework"
 
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Sun's XACML PDP, available from http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net/
 
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David W Chadwick, Wensheng Xu, Sassa Otenko, Romain Laborde and Bassem Nasser. "Multi-Session Separation of Duties (MSoD) for RBAC". First International Workshop on Security Technologies for Next Generation Collaborative Business Applications (SECOBAP'07), April 16--20, 2007, Istanbul, Turkey.
 
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OASIS "eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) Version 2.0" OASIS Standard, 1 Feb 2005
 
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B. Ramsdell et al. "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification". RFC 3851. July 2004


Collaborative Colleagues:
David W. Chadwick: colleagues
Stijn F. Lievens: colleagues