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The complexity of online memory checking
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Journal of the ACM (JACM) archive
Volume 56 ,  Issue 1  (January 2009) table of contents
Article No. 2  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISSN:0004-5411
Authors
Moni Naor  Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
Guy N. Rothblum  MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
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ABSTRACT

We consider the problem of storing a large file on a remote and unreliable server. To verify that the file has not been corrupted, a user could store a small private (randomized) “fingerprint” on his own computer. This is the setting for the well-studied authentication problem in cryptography, and the required fingerprint size is well understood. We study the problem of sublinear authentication: suppose the user would like to encode and store the file in a way that allows him to verify that it has not been corrupted, but without reading the entire file. If the user only wants to read q bits of the file, how large does the size s of the private fingerprint need to be? We define this problem formally, and show a tight lower bound on the relationship between s and q when the adversary is not computationally bounded, namely: s × q = Ω(n), where n is the file size. This is an easier case of the online memory checking problem, introduced by Blum et al. [1991], and hence the same (tight) lower bound applies also to that problem.

It was previously shown that, when the adversary is computationally bounded, under the assumption that one-way functions exist, it is possible to construct much better online memory checkers. The same is also true for sublinear authentication schemes. We show that the existence of one-way functions is also a necessary condition: even slightly breaking the s × q = Ω(n) lower bound in a computational setting implies the existence of one-way functions.


REFERENCES

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Moni Naor: colleagues
Guy N. Rothblum: colleagues