ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Counterfeiting and anti-counterfeitingof software and content
Full text PdfPdf (265 KB)
Source
Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Digital rights management table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
Pages 53-58  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-290-0
Authors
Yacov Yacobi  Microsoft Research, Redmond, WA, USA
Gideon Yaniv  COM Academic Studies, Rishon LeZion, Israel
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 5,   Downloads (12 Months): 76,   Citation Count: 0
Additional Information:

abstract   references   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1456520.1456522
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

We address a counterfeiter who pretends to be the legitimate producer of software or content, charges the same price as the latter and competes with her in the same market. We examine the legitimate producer's joint determination of the profit-maximizing price and intensity of monitoring the counterfeiter's illegal activity. Our approach involves an explicit solution of the profit-maximizing level of counterfeiting, based on a real probability of detection function. The analysis reveals that the profit-maximizing price is lower than the price set in the absence of counterfeiting and must be accompanied with some minimum level of monitoring to be positive. Depending on the level of counterfeiting, the profit-maximizing monitoring rate may rise or fall with an increase in the penalty rate or in the legitimate producer's share in the counterfeiter's fine and back payments, and may counter-intuitively rise with improvements in detection technology.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
Banerjee, D. S. 2003. Software Piracy: A strategic analysis and policy instruments. Int. J. Ind. Org. 21, 97--127.
 
2
Banerjee, D. S. 2006a. Lobbying and commercial software piracy. Eur. J. Pol. Ec. 22, 139--155.
 
3
Banerjee, D. S. 2006b. Enforcement sharing and commercial piracy. Rev. Ec. Res. Cop. Is. 3, 83--97.
 
4
Corless, R. M., Gonnet, G. H., Hare, D. E. G., Jeffrey, D. J., and Knuth, D. E. 1996. On the Lambert W function. Adv. Comp. Math. 5, 329--359.
 
5
Kiema, I., 2006 Modeling Commercial Piracy of Information Goods. Discussion Paper No. 130. Helsinki Center of Economic Research, University of Helsinki, Finland.
 
6
Varian, H. R. 1996 Economic Analysis of Copying. Unpublished Manuscript.
 
7
Yao, J-T. 2005. Counterfeiting and an optimal monitoring policy. Eur. J. Law Ec. 19, 95--114.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Yacov Yacobi: colleagues
Gideon Yaniv: colleagues