A security architecture for transient trust

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A security architecture for transient trust

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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Computer security architectures table of contents

Alexandria, Virginia, USA

SESSION: Trust and privacy table of contents

Pages 1-8

Year of Publication: 2008

ISBN:978-1-60558-300-6

Authors

Cynthia E. Irvine	Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA
Timothy E. Levin	Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA
Paul C. Clark	Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA
Thuy D. Nguyen	Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA

Sponsors

SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery

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ACM New York, NY, USA

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ABSTRACT

In extraordinary situations, certain individuals may require access to information for which they are not normally authorized. For example, to facilitate rescue of people trapped inside of a burning building, firefighters may need its detailed floor plan - information that may not typically be accessible to emergency responders. Thus, it is necessary to provide transient trust so that such sensitive information is available to selected individuals only during the emergency. The architecture presented here is designed to support transient trust. It encompasses pre-positioned, updateable domains for use exclusively during emergencies along with a set of "normal" domains with different sensitivity levels. Allocated to partitions, these domains are entered via a high integrity trusted path service located in a separate trusted partition. Interaction among subjects in different partitions is controlled by a high assurance separation kernel, and efficient use of devices is achieved through the application of a three-part device model. The resulting architecture enforces mandatory security policies, yet ensures secure and revocable access to a class of information during declared emergencies.

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