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Binding software to specific native hardware in a VM environment: the puf challenge and opportunity
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Virtual machine security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Hardware & monitoring table of contents
Pages 45-48  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-298-6
Authors
Mikhail J. Atallah  Arxan Technologies, Inc. and Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
Eric D. Bryant  Arxan Technologies, Inc., Huntsville, AL, USA
John T. Korb  Arxan Technologies, Inc. and Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
John R. Rice  Arxan Technologies, Inc. and Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

There are many practical situations in which, by policy, software is supposed to run on a specific hardware instance. This is not only useful to combat piracy, but also in national security situations, such as a battlefield loss of critical technology, where it is paramount that an enemy be unable to rehost the system on a different set of (possibly counterfeit) hardware. To achieve this binding, software vendors use techniques that can easily be foiled through virtualization: Whatever the software expected from the legitimate hardware, can instead be provided by a virtualization layer to fool the software into believing it is running on legitimate hardware. The recently demonstrated feasibility of physically unclonable functions (PUFs) make this attack somewhat harder, in that it is no longer possible to simulate the presence of the hardware in software. If PUF technology is used, carrying out this attack would require modification of the internals of the software to be fooled, a harder task but still possible with moderate effort. We present a way of using PUFs in a manner that makes it significantly harder for the attacker to carry out the attack. We also review the challenges and opportunities for virtualization that PUFs bring.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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M. J. Atallah, E. D. Bryant, and M. R. Stytz. A survey of anti-tamper technologies. CrossTalk: The Journal of Defense Software Engineering 17(11):12--16, 11 2004.
 
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J. Guajardo, S. S. Kumar, G. J. Schrijen, and P. Tuyls. Physical unclonable functions and public-key crypto for fpga ip protection. In International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and Applications pages 189--195, 2007.
 
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E. Simpson and P. Schaumont. Offline hardware/software authentication for recon figurable platforms. In L. Goubin and M. Matsui, editors, Proceedings of the 8th Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Workshop (CHES), Yokohama, Japan volume 4249 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 311--323.Springer, October 2006.
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Mikhail J. Atallah: colleagues
Eric D. Bryant: colleagues
John T. Korb: colleagues
John R. Rice: colleagues