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Boxing clever with IOMMUs
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Virtual machine security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Hardware & monitoring table of contents
Pages 39-44  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-298-6
Authors
Grzegorz Miloś  University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Derek G. Murray  University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Input/Output Memory Management Units (IOMMUs) have been touted as the solution to many problems in virtualisation security. Used naïvely, they can improve fault isolation and reduce the amount of trusted code. We contend that it is possible to do better.

In this paper, we introduce page boxing, a novel abstraction that allows untrusted virtual machines to manage data without having access to its contents. We illustrate how this can be used with an IOMMU to create a confidential end-to-end channel between disks and virtual machines. Unlike alternative approaches, we avoid the use of encryption, which gives the potential for high performance.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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M. Ben-Yehuda, J. Mason, O. Krieger, J. Xenidis, L. V. Doorn, A. Mallick, J. Nakajima, and E. Wahlig. Utilizing IOMMUs for Virtualization in Linux and Xen. In Proceedings of the 2006 Ottawa Linux Symposium, 2006.
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Grzegorz Miloś: colleagues
Derek G. Murray: colleagues