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VEP: a virtual machine for extended proof-carrying code
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Virtual machine security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Portability & recovery table of contents
Pages 9-18  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-298-6
Authors
Heidar Pirzadeh  University of Montreal, Montreal, PQ, Canada
Danny Dubé  Université Laval, Quebec City, PQ, Canada
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

One of the key issues with the practical applicability of Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) and its related methods is the difficulty in communicating the proofs which are inherently large. One way to alleviate this problem is to transmit, instead, a proof generator for the program in question in a generic extended PCC framework (EPCC). The EPCC needs to provide the execution of the proof generator at the consumer side in a secure manner. The ability to securely run arbitrary untrusted proof generator is a challenging problem.

We explore the design of a small and safe virtual machine (VEP) which provides the EPCC with a robust security guarantee. The VEP is a minor TCB extension of less than 300 lines of code which works as a safe execution environment and brings about a practical solution to thecommon security and resource management issues.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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A. W. Appel and D. C. Wang. JVM TCB: Measurements of the trusted computing base of Java virtual machines. Technical Report Technical Report CS-TR-647--02, Princeton University, 2002.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Heidar Pirzadeh: colleagues
Danny Dubé: colleagues