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Configurable security for scavenged storage systems
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Source
Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 4th ACM international workshop on Storage security and survivability table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Untrusted storage table of contents
Pages 55-62  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-299-3
Authors
Abdullah Gharaibeh  The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
Samer Al-Kiswany  The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
Matei Ripeanu  The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Scavenged storage systems harness unused disk space from individual workstations the same way idle CPU cycles are harnessed by desktop grid applications like Seti@Home. These systems provide a promising low cost, high-performance storage solution in certain high-end computing scenarios. However, selecting the security level and designing the security mechanisms for such systems is challenging as scavenging idle storage opens the door for security threats absent in traditional storage systems that use dedicated nodes under a single administrative domain. Moreover, increased security often comes at the price of performance and scalability. This paper develops a general threat model for systems that use scavenged storage, presents the design of a protocol that addresses these threats and is optimized for throughput, and evaluates the overheads brought by the new security protocol when configured to provide a number of different security properties.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Gobioff, H. B., Security for a High Performance Commodity Storage Subsystem. 1999, Carnegie Mellon University.
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Abdullah Gharaibeh: colleagues
Samer Al-Kiswany: colleagues
Matei Ripeanu: colleagues