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Tahoe: the least-authority filesystem
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 4th ACM international workshop on Storage security and survivability table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Encryption table of contents
Pages 21-26  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-299-3
Authors
Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn  allmydata.com, San Francisco, CA, USA
Brian Warner  allmydata.com, San Francisco, CA, USA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Tahoe is a system for secure, distributed storage. It uses capabilities for access control, cryptography for confidentiality and integrity, and erasure coding for fault-tolerance. It has been deployed in a commercial backup service and is currently operational. The implementation is Open Source.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn: colleagues
Brian Warner: colleagues