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Measuring unlinkability revisited
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 7th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Measuring privacy table of contents
Pages 105-110  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-289-4
Authors
Lars Fischer  Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany
Stefan Katzenbeisser  Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany
Claudia Eckert  Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Unlinkability describes the inability of an observer to decide whether certain items of interest are related or not. Privacy aware protocol designers need a consistent and meaningful unlinkability measure to asses protocols in face of different attacks. In this paper we show that entropy measures are not sufficient for measuring unlinkability. We propose an alternative measure that estimates the error made by an attacker. We show by example that our expected distance provides a consistent measure that offers a better estimation of message-unlinkability.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Lars Fischer: colleagues
Stefan Katzenbeisser: colleagues
Claudia Eckert: colleagues