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Towards provable secure neighbor discovery in wireless networks
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 6th ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
Pages: 31-42  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-288-7
Authors
Marcin Poturalski  EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland
Panos Papadimitratos  EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland
Jean-Pierre Hubaux  EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In wireless systems, neighbor discovery (ND) is a fundamental building block: determining which devices are within direct radio communication is an enabler for networking protocols and a wide range of applications. To thwart abuse of ND and the resultant compromise of the dependent functionality of wireless systems, numerous works proposed solutions to secure ND. Nonetheless, until very recently, there has been no formal analysis of secure ND protocols. We close this gap in [24], but we concentrate primarily on the derivation of an impossibility result for a class of protocols. In this paper, we focus on reasoning about specific protocols. First, we contribute a number of extensions and refinements on the framework of [24]. As we are particularly concerned with the practicality of provably secure ND protocols, we investigate availability and redefine accordingly the ND specification, and also consider composability of ND with other protocols. Then, we propose and analyze two secure ND protocols: We revisit one of the protocols analyzed in [24], and introduce and prove correct a more elaborate challenge-response protocol.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Marcin Poturalski: colleagues
Panos Papadimitratos: colleagues
Jean-Pierre Hubaux: colleagues