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Local abstract verification and refinement of security protocols
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 6th ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
Pages 21-30  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-288-7
Authors
Ti Zhou  National University of Defence Technology, Changsha, China
Mengjun Li  National University of Defence Technology, Changsha, China
Zhoujun Li  BeiHang University, Beijing, China
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

The verification problem for security protocols is undecidable, but it is feasible to verify protocols by abstract interpretation. This paper presents a method based on local abstraction and refinement for verifying security protocols terminably. Local abstraction produces a safe approximation of the security protocol, modeled as a set of Horn logic rules. Refinement removes false attacks introduced by local abstraction. In contrast with methods based on global abstraction, our method abstracts only certain rules that can lead to non-termination when computing fixpoints, that is, it does not abstract all rules. We implement this method in a verification tool SPVT and are able to verify well-known protocols. Moreover, our experiments indicate that local abstraction is less costly than global abstraction.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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M. Li, T. Zhou, Z. Li, and H. Chen. An abstraction and refinement framework for verifying security protocols based on logic programming. In I. Cervesato, editor, ASIAN 2007, volume 4846 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 166--180, Berlin Heidelberg, 12 2007. Springer-Verlag.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Ti Zhou: colleagues
Mengjun Li: colleagues
Zhoujun Li: colleagues