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Robust content-driven reputation
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Workshop on AISec table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Reputation table of contents
Pages 33-42  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-291-7
Authors
Krishnendu Chatterjee  UC Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, USA
Luca de Alfaro  UC Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, USA
Ian Pye  UC Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, USA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In content-driven reputation systems for collaborative content, users gain or lose reputation according to how their contributions fare: authors of long-lived contributions gain reputation, while authors of reverted contributions lose reputation. Existing content-driven systems are prone to Sybil attacks, in which multiple identities, controlled by the same person, perform coordinated actions to increase their reputation. We show that content-driven reputation systems can be made resistant to such attacks by taking advantage of the fact that the reputation increments and decrements depend on content modifications, which are visible to all. We present an algorithm for content-driven reputation that prevents a set of identities from increasing their maximum reputation without doing any useful work. Here, work is considered useful if it causes content to evolve in a direction that is consistent with the actions of high-reputation users. We argue that the content modifications that require no effort, such as the insertion or deletion of arbitrary text, are invariably non-useful. We prove a truthfullness result for the resulting system, stating that users who wish to perform a contribution do not gain by employing complex contribution schemes, compared to simply performing the contribution at once. In particular, splitting the contribution in multiple portions, or employing the coordinated actions of multiple identities, do not yield additional reputation. Taken together, these results indicate that content-driven systems can be made robust with respect to Sybil attacks.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Krishnendu Chatterjee: colleagues
Luca de Alfaro: colleagues
Ian Pye: colleagues