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POSH: a generalized captcha with security applications
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Workshop on AISec table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: User-facing systems table of contents
Pages 1-10  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-291-7
Authors
Waseem Daher  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
Ran Canetti  IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Hawthorne, NY, USA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

A puzzle only solvable by humans, or POSH, is a prompt or question with three important properties: it can be generated by a computer, it can be answered consistently by a human, and a human answer cannot be efficiently predicted by a computer. In fact, unlike a CAPTCHA, a POSH does not necessarily have to be verifiable by a computer at all. One application of POSHes is a scheme proposed by Canetti et al.~that limits off-line dictionary attacks against password-protected local storage, without the use of any secure hardware or secret storage.

We explore the area of POSHes, implement several candidate POSHes and have users solve them, to evaluate their effectiveness. Given these data, we then implement the above scheme as an extension to the Mozilla Firefox web browser, where it is used to protect user certificates and saved passwords. In the course of doing so, we also define certain aspects of the threat model for our implementation (and the scheme) more precisely.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
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2
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4
W. Daher. Patch for Firefox. http://puzzles.mit.edu/firefox/patch.diff, April 2008.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Waseem Daher: colleagues
Ran Canetti: colleagues