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The risks with security metrics
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Quality of protection table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Risk table of contents
Pages: 65-70  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-321-1
Authors
Marco D. Aime  Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy
Andrea Atzeni  Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy
Paolo C. Pomi  Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

A proper security metrics and measurement process is thus a means to automatize security decisions. Unfortunately, so far automatic security evaluation techniques have failed to achieve the performance of security experts. In this paper we argue security metrics are by nature highly unstable in time. Moreover, their effectiveness depends on specific target of evaluation. In this paper we elaborate this finding and we describe our experimental framework with its results.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Marco D. Aime: colleagues
Andrea Atzeni: colleagues
Paolo C. Pomi: colleagues