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Prioritizing software security fortification throughcode-level metrics
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Quality of protection table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Software security table of contents
Pages 31-38  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-321-1
Authors
Michael Gegick  North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA
Laurie Williams  North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA
Jason Osborne  North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA
Mladen Vouk  North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Limited resources preclude software engineers from finding and fixing all vulnerabilities in a software system. We create predictive models to identify which components are likely to have the most security risk. Software engineers can use these models to make measurement-based risk management decisions and to prioritize software security fortification efforts, such as redesign and additional inspection and testing. We mined and analyzed data from a large commercial telecommunications software system containing over one million lines of code that had been deployed to the field for two years. Using recursive partitioning, we built attack-prone prediction models with the following code-level metrics: static analysis tool alert density, code churn, and count of source lines of code. One model identified 100% of the attack-prone components (40% of the total number of components) with an 8% false positive rate. As such, the model could be used to prioritize fortification efforts in the system.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Michael Gegick: colleagues
Laurie Williams: colleagues
Jason Osborne: colleagues
Mladen Vouk: colleagues