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Traitor tracing with constant size ciphertext
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Applied cryptography 2 table of contents
Pages 501-510  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-810-7
Authors
Dan Boneh  Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Moni Naor  Weizmann Institute, Rehovot, Israel
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

A traitor tracing system enables a publisher to trace a pirate decryption box to one of the secret keys used to create the box. We present a traitor tracing system where ciphertext size is "constant," namely independent of the number of users in the system and the collusion bound. A ciphertext in our system consists of only two elements where the length of each element depends only on the security parameter. The down side is that private-key size is quadratic in the collusion bound. Our construction is based on recent constructions for fingerprinting codes.


REFERENCES

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